with questions like the following. Some of these same questions may have occurred to you:
What if I completely trust electronic voting booths and I don't want to look at my
Vote Word?
Then don't. You just vote as you always have. Little has changed inside that voting booth.
What modifications are necessary in an electronic voting booth?
A software change and the addition, if necessary, of an LCD or LED that can display your
Vote Word. No printers, scanners or "Smart cards" are necessary.
What if I forget my Vote Word?
First of all, it's a short word in your native language. But if you cannot remember it, then you
probably will want to write it on a piece of paper and keep it with you until you can get to a
computer to audit your vote.
What happens if I check the Web and find that my vote was recorded incorrectly?
So far, electronic voting booths have been quite accurate, but if a problem were to occur,
you would report the error. The election authorities would wait to see if a number of other
people also report a problem. If there are just a few reports of problems out of hundreds or
thousands of votes cast, then election authorities will likely feel justified that it is a case of
"user error". But if a number of voters report a problem, then two things will probably take
place: (1) an investigation into the process or the software to determine what happened and
(2) a re-vote.
What if someone tries to help the losing candidate by falsely reporting a problem?
This is a self-correcting problem. Here's what would happen if someone was so disappointed
that Sally Smith lost to John Jones that he tried to cheat. (As described above, if just a few
people report that their Vote Word is wrong, then the election authorities would likely
ascribe this to "probable user error"). Let's say a very disappointed - and dishonest - Sally
Smith supporter called all his friends and got them to report that their Vote Word incorrectly
shows that they voted for John Jones. To do this, these cheaters would have to use someone
else's published Vote Word. When they tell their "problem" to the election office, the
officials will then post those alleged Vote Words in a public forum, like the Web.
At this point, the voters who actually were issued those Vote Words will be able to see that
someone is claiming their Vote Word as their own and would begin to lodge their protests
with the election authorities. In other words, what we would have is a very public dispute
about just whose Vote Words are out there. The election authorities would then make the
decision as to whether they need to examine the software and the polling place where the
alleged problem occurred. If they feel that there's probable cause to audit the equipment and
processes at that voting location, then they would descend on that polling place and begin
their investigation.
Is this perfect? Of course not. The very best solution in a perfect world would be if
everyone got a paper receipt when they voted. In this perfect world, printers would never
jam or run out of ink, tax-payers wouldn't mind paying for the extra hardware, voters
wouldn't mind the longer lines waiting or the longer time in the voting booth and no one
would try to sell their vote. And most important: in this perfect world, if the voting authorities
decide on a recount, then everyone would keep their receipt and would turn it in to the
voting authorities.
What if the "true owners" of those Vote Words don't step forward to dispute the
Sally Smith gang (in the previous question)?
Interesting point, and it brings up the fact that this Vote Word idea places the responsibility
on the voter. Not only do we have a responsibility to vote, but we also have the
responsibility to stay informed. If a cabal of Sally Smith supporters tries to reverse an
election by falsely reporting incorrect Vote Words, then the news media are certainly going
to be reporting this. At that point, when the disputed Vote Words are published in the
newspapers, there will be a process in place whereby you will be able to report in
confidence that you, in fact, were issued that Vote Word. So if a gang of, say, 30 Sally Smith
supporters tries to overturn an election, then it's realistic to envision that about 5 or 10 of the
real Vote Word holders will step up to discredit them.
It's worth thinking about how likely this whole scenario is. First, imagine 30 people getting
together to claim other people's Vote Words - and every single one of these 30 people
risking jail time to do it. Second, it has to be in an election where 30 votes is the deciding
margin. Finally, these 30 people risk everything in the assumption that when this story hits the
news media, no one will challenge them.
"If it can happen, it will happen", you say. And I would answer that you're right - which is
why Vote Word addresses that scenario. But I also think that if we go down the path of
trying to methodically tie every vote to a voter, or send the voter home with a printed slip of
paper, then the balance has been tipped: we will be abandoning personal responsibility. We
will be deluding ourselves thinking that we can eliminate dishonesty and incompetence by
traveling down the path of extremely restrictive and complex voting systems. If, instead, we
say "Let the voters audit their own darn vote", then we've returned to a more public,
transparent system. And a simpler one.
What about "vote selling"?
This is a real concern. In fact, some states have passed laws that say that it is prohibited to
implement and use any voting device that permits a voter to prove who he/she voted for.
Why? If voters can prove who they voted for, then they are able to sell their vote to the
highest bidder.
You would think that - because the Vote Word is displayed only - there's no way you can
definitively prove who you voted for. That's pretty much true. But someone recently
described for me the following scenario. Let's say Joe Slime, a local contractor, has the
money - and ruthless resolve - to try to buy an election. He could, in theory, call a number of
people before the election and offer them $100 for their vote. Then he could send his minions
to wait outside the polling place and accost those voters as they exit the polling place. These
bad guys could demand to know the Vote Word as proof that the voter delivered. The idea
is that the voter would have no way of yet knowing the Vote Word, so there's no chance of
making one up. (Of course, since Vote Words are such common words, the voter could
guess at one. But the theory here is that the voter is in cahoots with the bad guys). So the
voter must be telling the truth and is therefore able to collect his $100.
Is there a simple way to stop that? Sure: all you have to do is allow people to check their
Vote Word before they leave the polling place. This completely erases the credibility of
anyone walking out of the polling place if they say, "My Vote Word is 'mud' and I voted for
you", because they easily could have looked it up before exiting.
This is fascinating to me: once again more transparency - not less - solves the problem.
And here's another thought on vote selling. We're right to make it as difficult as possible to
buy or sell votes. But there are already easier ways to buy votes than post your minions
outside the polling place. I'm sure someone has brought an inexpensive digital camera into a
polling booth - the kind of camera that can shoot a 15-second video. All you have to do is
email your video to Joe Slime and you can collect your $100. People may well be doing that
now - but I sure would hate to see voters have to go through metal detectors and be patted
down before voting.
Okay, how about the simple case where some corrupt official simply adds 100 votes
to a candidate's total - and uses perfectly good Vote Words?
Luckily, election officials have figured this out already. You may have noticed when you go
to vote that the poll workers keep a very tightly controlled count of how many voters walk
into the booths. In our town (in NJ) they use serialized slips of paper which they relate back
to the sign-in sheets. However this is accomplished, the intent is the same: the total number
of people accounted for must equal (or be very, very close to) the total number of votes cast.
So if Sally Smith beats John Jones 600 to 400, then the paper record (yes: paper!) showing
how many people signed to vote must be 1,000.
Just how many Vote Words do you need in the entire United States?
Anywhere from 5,000 to 8,000.
Say what??? More than 100 million people voted in 2004.
Remember, we can give out the same word, like "house" at every voting location in the
country. If "house" is your Vote Word, you look it up only where you voted.
But surely there are voting locations where more than 8,000 might show up. What
happens when you run out of words?
The software is designed to start issuing "word pairs" once words are exhausted. Using this
method, the total number of Vote Words that can be issued in a single location goes from
8,000 to 64,000,000 (That's 8,000 squared).
So why are state governments considering the purchase of electronic voting booths
that have receipt printers? Isn't that an expensive solution?
Yes, voting booths that supply a paper receipt for the voter are very expensive - they're
expensive to purchase, expensive to operate, expensive to maintain and expensive to replace
when the mechanical printers break. Worse than that, though, is the fact that even if a polling
location performs a re-count with paper ballot back-ups, the voters still have no idea
whether their vote was included in the re-count or whether their vote was recorded correctly.
Then why are state governments headed down that road?
To be fair, they're doing it for good reasons The main purpose for a "Voter-verified Paper
Trail" (VVPT) - sometimes called "Voter-verified Paper Ballot" - is so that a polling place
has something to re-count if the electronic machines die. But, as mentioned above, a
re-count performed with paper ballots is still not a transparent process: how do know that
your vote was re-counted?
So is the idea of a "Voter-verified paper ballot" completely without merit?
Actually, no - if it's married to Vote Word. That is, if your Vote Word is printed on the
paper ballot (and that paper is required to remain at the polling location) then you would
have an airtight system. Overpriced - but airtight. That way, if they do have to perform a
re-count, your Vote Word would get re-entered into the computer, along with your vote.
Then you could go to the Web to make sure that the re-count was performed correctly.
